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DRAWING LINES: RACIAL
GERRYMANDERING IN BETHUNEHILL V. VIRGINIA BOARD OF
ELECTIONS
SCOTT REED∗
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has held that legislative district-drawing merits
strict scrutiny when based predominantly on race.1 In Bethune-Hill v.
Virginia Board of Elections,2 the Supreme Court had to decide whether
twelve Virginia challenged legislative districts, in which a one-size-fitsall 55% black voting age population (“BVAP”) floor was imposed,
withstood constitutional scrutiny. In particular, it had to decide whether
the court below erred in: (1) concluding that the admitted use of the
BVAP percentage to draw the challenged districts does not amount to
racial predominance; (2) employing a standard for racial predominance
that requires the use of race result in “actual conflict” with traditional
districting criteria; and (3) concluding that the Virginia legislature’s
predominant use of race in drawing House District 75, a district in
question, satisfies strict scrutiny by being narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.3 The Court ultimately held that the
district court incorrectly applied the predominance test, but declined to
hold that race predominated in the eleven districts, instead remanding
the case to the district court for reexamination.4 The Court also
affirmed the district court’s ruling on House District 75.5
This commentary will argue that the stated prioritization of the
55% BVAP percentage above all other criteria in the redistricting
Copyright © 2017 Scott Reed.
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1. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995).
2. 137 S. Ct. 788, 800 (2017).
3. Question Presented Report, Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 136 S. Ct. 2406,
No. 15-680 (2016).
4. Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct at 800.
5. Id. at 800–01.
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process, satisfies the predominance test set forth by the Court in Miller
v. Johnson.6 Accordingly, the Court should have held that race
predominated in the formation of all twelve challenged districts, and
remanded the case to the district court solely for strict scrutiny analysis
on the eleven districts apart from House District 75. The Court should
also have vacated the lower court’s ruling that House District 75 passed
the strict scrutiny test, and stated that the use of a BVAP number
requires more than anecdotal testimony from a district’s incumbent
representative. Throughout its analysis, the Court should also have
been mindful of substantial policy considerations that weigh in favor of
increased judicial oversight of blanket BVAP targets.
I. FACTS
Following the 2010 census, the Virginia state legislature attempted
to redraw the legislative districts for the Virginia House of Delegates
and the Virginia Senate.7 Delegate Chris Jones led the effort in
redrawing the districts for the Virginia House.8 During the formulation
of the new districting plan (“the 2011 plan”), the House Committee on
Privileges and Elections adopted a resolution with the criteria that the
committee would follow in evaluating redistricting plans—those
criteria were: (1) population equality among the districts; (2)
compliance with the Voting Rights Act, in particular by protecting
against retrogression or dilution of racial or ethnic minority voting
strength; (3) contiguity and compactness of each district; (4) creating
single-member districts; and (5) basing districting on factors that can
create or contribute to communities of interest.9 The resolution
provided that each of the five categories would be considered, but that
population equality among districts and compliance with the Voting
Rights Act would be given priority.10
Since the Commonwealth of Virginia was a covered jurisdiction
under the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) at the time the redistricting
legislation was passed,11 any new districting plan had to comply with
Section 5 of the VRA. This required that any new districting plan not
result in a “retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 511 (E.D. Va. 2015).
Id.
Id. at 518.
Id.
Id. at 511.
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to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”12 Using the
previous districting regime, which contained twelve majority-minority
districts, as a benchmark in an attempt to comply with Section 5 of the
VRA, Delegate Jones created a House plan with twelve majorityminority districts—the twelve districts eventually challenged by
Appellants.13
Under the pre-existing districting plan, the twelve challenged
districts had BVAPs between 46.3% and 62.7%.14 Under the 2011 plan,
the BVAPs in the twelve majority-minority districts exceeded 55%,15
ranging from 55.2% to 60.7%.16 The 55% BVAP figure was used
expressly in drawing the twelve districts.17 Although testimony at trial
was contradictory as to the source of the 55% BVAP floor, the district
court found that the number was based on concerns relating to the reelection of a delegate of one of the challenged districts and on feedback
from three other delegates of challenged districts.18
The redistricting plan was enacted into law when the Governor
signed House Bill 5005 in April 2011.19 To comply with the commands
of the VRA, Virginia submitted the enacted districting plan to the
Department of Justice, which pre-cleared the plan in June 2011.20 The
first election using the new districting plan was held on November 8,
2011.21
In December 2014, Respondents (twelve individual plaintiffs, each
a citizen of one of the twelve districts) filed a complaint seeking
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief prohibiting the Virginia
State Board of Elections from implementing the redistricting or from
conducting further elections based on those districts.22 Respondents
alleged that the twelve districts were racial gerrymanders in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.23 The case was heard by a three-judge

12. Id. (citing Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)).
13. Id. at 511–12.
14. Id. at 519.
15. Id. at 520.
16. Brief for Appellants at 11, Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 136 S. Ct. 2406
(No. 15-680) (2016) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners].
17. Bethune-Hill, 141 F. Supp. 3d at 519.
18. See id. at 522.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 512.
23. Id.
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district court panel, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a).24 The Virginia
House of Delegates and Virginia Speaker of the House William Howell
intervened.25 The case was heard by a three-judge panel for the Eastern
District of Virginia in July 2015.26
The three-judge panel rejected the plaintiffs’ claim and held that all
twelve of the challenged districts satisfied the scrutiny of the Equal
Protection Clause.27 It determined that predominance requires a
showing of “actual conflict” between the use of race and other
criteria.28 It determined that, under Alabama, evidence of BVAP
threshold use suggested, but did not prove, racial predominance.29
To evaluate racial predominance, the majority examined, district by
district, circumstantial evidence of compliance with traditional, neutraldistricting criteria, including the following: contiguity, compactness,
existing political subdivisions, natural geography, “nesting,” precinct
locations, communities of interest, and state criteria.30 It held that the
plaintiffs had proven that race was the predominant factor in the
formation of only one of the twelve challenged districts—House
District 75.31 Applying a strict scrutiny test to the formation of House
District 75, the majority held that Virginia’s interest in compliance with
the VRA was a compelling interest at the time the 2011 plan was
enacted.32 Finding that there was a “strong basis in evidence” for the
use of race in drawing the districts, the majority concluded that the
predominant use of race was narrowly tailored to further a compelling
governmental interest.33 The majority ultimately held that each of the
twelve challenged districts withstood the Equal Protection Clause
challenge and found for defendants.34

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 571 (E.D. Va. 2015).
28. Id. at 524.
29. See id. at 532. (“Alabama . . . holds that racial thresholds constitute evidence, but not
dispositive proof of, racial predominance.”).
30. Id. at 535–39.
31. Id. at 510–11.
32. Id. at 547.
33. See id. at 559 (holding that Virginia’s actual compliance with the Voting Rights Act
constituted a compelling state interest at the time the redistricting plan was enacted, and that the
action was narrowly tailored because there was a “good reason” for the legislature to believe that
the BVAP percentage employed was necessary for compliance with the VRA).
34. Id. at 571.
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After the panel ruled in favor of the defendants, the plaintiffs filed
their notice of appeal on October 26, 2015.35 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on June 6, 2016.36
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Right to Vote and the Equal Protection Clause
While the original Constitution did not explicitly protect the right
to vote, subsequent amendments contained language indicating that
such a right did exist.37 In 1964, the Supreme Court expressly stated that
there was a right to vote in Wesberry v. Sanders.38 A contemporaneous
decision, Reynolds v. Sims,39 established that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause required states to draw
legislative districts in a way that equally weighed each citizen’s vote.40
The Court famously declared “one person, one vote” in Gray v.
Sanders,41 saying that a “conception of political equality” existed in the
Constitution.42
B. Racial Gerrymandering
Gerrymandering, or district-drawing done for partisan gain, that is
based on race, triggers strict scrutiny review. In Alabama Legislative
Black Caucus v. Alabama,43 the Court held that strict scrutiny applies if
race was the “predominant” consideration in deciding to place a
35. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 16, at 1.
36. Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 136 S. Ct. 2406 (2016).
37. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”); id.
amend. XIX (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . .
on account of sex.”); id. amend. XXIV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote . . .
shall not be denied or abridged . . . by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”); id.
amend. XXVI, § 1 (“The rights of the citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age
or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of age.”).
38. See 376 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1964) ( “No right is more precious in a free country than that of
having a voice in the election of those who make the laws . . . [o]ther rights, even the most basic,
are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification
of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right.”).
39. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
40. See id. at 568 (holding that seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be
apportioned by population).
41. 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (holding that a state’s county unit system which, while giving every
qualified voter in a statewide election one vote, employed system which in end result weighted
rural votes more heavily than urban votes, and weighted some smaller rural counties heavier than
other large rural counties, violated, inter alia, the Equal Protection Clause).
42. See id. at 381.
43. 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015).
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significant number of voters within or without a given district.44 In
Miller v. Johnson,45 the Court said that race predominates if the
legislature “subordinated traditional race-neutral districting
principles” to racial considerations.46 These traditional districting
principles include, but are not limited to, district compactness, district
contiguity, and respect for current political subdivisions or
communities.47 An equal population goal is not a factor to consider in
a predominance analysis, but instead is in the background of the
redistricting process.48 Evidence of racial predomination may be either
circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and demographics, or
direct evidence of legislative purpose.49
If race predominated in the drawing of district lines, a state must
show that the use of race is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest.50 Where VRA compliance is cited as a
compelling interest, the legislature must have a “strong basis in
evidence” for the use of race.51
C. The Voting Rights Act
Section 5 of the VRA required that a state prove that its new district
lines do not cause a “retrogression in the position of racial minorities
with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.”52 The
Supreme Court said in Alabama that Section 5 of the VRA requires a
state to ensure that minority voters “retain the ability to elect their
preferred candidates,” but not necessarily maintain the same
population percentages in majority-minority districts as the prior
districting plan.53 The Court held that the coverage formula in Section
4b of the VRA is unconstitutional in 2013.54
Taking into account the dueling requirements of the VRA and the
Equal Protection Clause, a state such as Virginia must consider race in
drawing legislative districts in order to devise a plan complying with

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 1264.
515 U.S. 900 (1995).
Id. at 916.
Id.
Alabama, 135 S. Ct. at 1270.
Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
Alabama, 135 S. Ct. at 1262 (citing Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 907–08 (1996)).
Id. at 1274.
Miller, 515 U.S. at 906 (quoting Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)).
Alabama, 135 S. Ct. at 1273.
Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
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Section 5 of the VRA55—but at the same time a state cannot
subordinate traditional, race-neutral principles of district-drawing to
racial considerations in drawing the district boundaries.56
III. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners argue that the “actual conflict” standard used by the
lower court is incorrect—since the standard for racial predominance
under Miller and Alabama is merely that the legislature prioritizes race
above traditional districting principles, there is no need to show any
actual conflict between those principles and race.57 According to
Petitioners, by disregarding direct evidence, such as statements by
Delegate Jones as to the importance of the BVAP percentage and
official criteria indicating that compliance with the VRA was a
priority,58 the lower court ignores Supreme Court statements that racial
targets (such as a BVAP percentage) were “strong, perhaps
overwhelming evidence” of racial predomination.59 Petitioners then
argue that the majority “systematically disregarded” the role of race in
the legislature’s decision to structure each individual district.60
Petitioners contend that the direct evidence that Respondent had
prioritized the 55% BVAP percentage, together with circumstantial
evidence of race-based districts, proved racial predominance and
merited strict scrutiny.61 According to Petitioners, the lower court either
ignored such evidence or failed to give it the proper weight under
Alabama.62
Petitioners contend that none of the twelve challenged districts
would satisfy strict scrutiny.63 Petitioners argue first that the lower court
used an incorrect legal framework in addressing whether the use of race

55. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 (stating that the VRA requires that any proposed change not
result in the retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their electoral
franchise).
56. See id. (stating that plaintiffs in a racial gerrymandering case must show that the
legislature subordinated traditional criteria to racial considerations).
57. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 16, at 16.
58. Id. at 20–29.
59. Id. at 12 (quoting Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1263, 1267, 1271
(2015)).
60. See id. at 30–56 (discussing each of the twelve districts individually).
61. Id. at 9.
62. Id. at 12.
63. Id. at 59.
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in drawing House District 75 was narrowly tailored to avoid
retrogression. Instead of simply asking whether the legislature had a
“strong basis in evidence” for using race, the majority invented a wholly
new standard, which required showing whether a legislature could
reasonably believe that deviations were not substantial.64 Second,
Petitioners argue that the lower court erred in finding that the only
“strong basis” for using the BVAP figure was testimony from the
representative of HD 75, advocating for more minority voters so that
they could elect a candidate of their choice—an insufficient interest,
according to Petitioners, to satisfy strict scrutiny.65
B. Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents argue that the district court panel correctly assessed
predominance, based on language in Alabama stating that strict
scrutiny should apply only if Petitioners prove that BVAP targets had
a “direct and significant” impact on the lines as drawn.66 Respondents
concede that a BVAP target can be evidence of race-based decisionmaking, but state that, under Alabama, predominance turns on whether
a legislature neglected other districting principles in order to achieve a
racial goal.67
Respondents argue that while the Court in Alabama treated the use
of BVAP targets as evidence of race-conscious decisions, it did not hold
that the use of a BVAP target necessarily merited strict scrutiny.68
Respondents also argue that a BVAP target is not even necessarily
strong evidence of race-based decision-making, as such a target could
be consistent with other traditional districting principles.69
Respondents also argue that the use of the BVAP percentage in
drawing HD 75 was narrowly tailored, as it satisfies strict scrutiny for
legislators to have had “good reasons” with “a strong basis in evidence”
to make the race-based decision;70 they additionally argue that there
were good reasons to believe that maintaining a 55%+ BVAP was
necessary to prevent minority retrogression.71 They also emphasize

64. Id. at 56–57 (quoting Alabama, 135 S. Ct. at 1274).
65. Id. at 57–58.
66. Brief for Appellees at 20, Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 136 S. Ct. 2406 (No.
15-680) (2016) (quoting Alabama, 135 S. Ct. at 1271) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents].
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 22–23.
70. Id. at 51 (quoting Alabama, 135 S. Ct. at 1273).
71. Id. at 54.
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Delegate Jones’ functional analysis, using metrics such as census data,
voter registration, and meetings with delegates, to argue that requiring
any more from the legislature would create a demanding standard and
a burden on states.72
IV. HOLDING
The Supreme Court announced its decision in Bethune-Hill v.
Virginia Board of Elections on March 1, 2017.73 The Court agreed with
Petitioners that the “actual conflict” standard used by the district court
was incorrect.74 The Court stated that “a conflict or inconsistency
between the enacted plan and traditional redistricting criteria is not a
threshold requirement or mandatory precondition in order to establish
a claim of racial gerrymandering” – though it also stated that such a
conflict or inconsistency could be persuasive evidence of racial
predomination.75 The Court also agreed with Petitioners that the
district court gave insufficient weight to the 55% BVAP target and
other evidence of racial predominance.76 However, the Court declined
the opportunity to hold that race predominated in the eleven districts,
stating that the district court is best suited to determine racial
predomination and, if race did predominate, to perform strict scrutiny
analysis.77 It vacated the district court’s ruling with respect to eleven of
the twelve challenged districts and remanded the case to the lower
court.78 With respect to House District 75, the Court affirmed the lower
court’s ruling that the district survived strict scrutiny, holding that the
functional analysis done by Delegate Jones showed that the legislature
had a strong basis in evidence to believe that a 55% BVAP floor was
necessary to prevent retrogression under Section 5 of the VRA.79
V. ANALYSIS
This case provided the Court with an opportunity to review the
application of the Alabama/Miller standard for racial predominance.
The Court rightly criticized the lower court’s use of an “actual conflict”
standard for racial predominance. However, rather than simply
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 55.
Bethune-Hill v. Va. Board of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017).
Id. at 798.
Id. at 799.
Id.
Id. at 800.
Id. at 795.
Id. at 801.
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vacating the lower court’s decision and remanding, the Court should
have gone further and held that the stated prioritization of the 55%
BVAP percentage above all other criteria in the redistricting process
showed that race predominated. Accordingly, the Court should have
held that race predominated in the formation of all twelve challenged
districts and remanded the case to the district court solely for strict
scrutiny analysis on the eleven districts apart from House District 75.
As to House District 75, the Court should also have vacated the lower
court’s ruling that House District 75 passed strict scrutiny, and held that
anecdotal testimony from a district’s incumbent representative is not a
“strong basis in evidence” that a BVAP number is required.
Throughout its analysis, the Court should also have been mindful of
substantial policy considerations that weigh in favor of increased
judicial oversight of blanket BVAP targets.
A. The BVAP Percentage as Used Here Satisfies the “Predominance”
Test from Alabama and Miller
The stated prioritization of the BVAP percentage clearly satisfies
the racial predomination test from Alabama and Miller. Miller stated
that race predominates if it subordinates all other criteria.80 Here, direct
statements from Delegate Jones as well as officially adopted criteria for
the redistricting process plainly indicate that the use of the BVAP
percentage for VRA compliance predominated over all other
districting criteria. The House resolution explicitly prioritized (1) equal
population among districts and (2) VRA compliance; since Alabama
has clarified that an equal population goal is not to be weighed as a
factor but rather exists in the background, the adopted resolution
indicates that VRA compliance was the predominant factor to be
considered.81 In addition, statements by Delegate Jones, the architect
of the enacted redistricting plan, that VRA compliance was “the most
important thing” and that VRA compliance “trumped everything”
clearly show that race predominated.82 There is no plainer evidence
that race predominated in drawing districts than direct statements and
adopted criteria that explicitly prioritize racial targets over other
decision-making criteria. The Court has already said that blanket racial
targets such as a fixed BVAP percentage are strong and perhaps

80. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
81. See Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1262 (2015).
82. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 16, at 26–27.

FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

3/22/2017 4:48 PM

DRAWING LINES

187

overwhelming evidence that race predominated.83 Here is such a case.
Accordingly, the Court should have held that a stated prioritization of
racial targets above all other criteria is racial “predominance” and
triggers strict scrutiny.
B. A “Strong Basis in Evidence” for the Use of a Fixed Racial
Threshold for VRA Compliance Requires More Than Anecdotal
Testimony from a District’s Representative
As to the strict scrutiny analysis, the Court should have held that a
“strong basis in evidence” for the use of race requires more than
anecdotal conversations with incumbent representatives. The Court has
previously required that a demanding standard be met for the
government to classify based on race. In City of Richmond v. Croson,84
the Court held that findings including testimony from community
leaders and statistical evidence about discrepancies in minority
contractor representation were insufficient to provide a strong basis in
evidence that a 30% minority quota was necessary.85 Here, the district
court seemed to think that conversations with incumbent
representatives, together with census data, were sufficient to justify the
55% BVAP figure. The Court should have held that this is not the case
and order the district court to be more demanding in its strict scrutiny
analysis.
C. Substantial Policy Considerations Weigh in Favor of Judicial
Oversight
Finally, the Court should have been mindful that are also
substantial policy considerations in play: the dilution of minority power
in state legislatures and Congress by “packing” minority voters into a
smaller number of districts and an increase in partisan gridlock due to
gerrymandering merit increased scrutiny in gerrymandering cases
when race is a priority in district-drawing.
The first policy consideration is that gerrymandering, intended to
increase the share of minority voters in a given district, can have the
effect of diluting minority power in a legislature.86 By mandating that a
83. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. at 1263 (2015).
84. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
85. Id. at 499–500.
86. See Kim Soffen, How Racial Gerrymandering Deprives Black People of Political Power,
WASH. POST (June 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp /2016/06/09/how-awidespread-practice-to-politically-empower-african-americans-might-actually-harmthem/?utm_term=.507509fa05c0.
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district have a certain percentage of minority voters, a legislature can
effectively dilute the power of minority voters by consolidating them
into fewer districts.87 Such practices can undermine any intended effect
to increase minority representation in positions of political influence,
and runs afoul of the Court’s long-held belief in a “conception of
political equality” within the Constitution,88 warranting closer attention
to gerrymandering based on race.
The second policy consideration is that racial gerrymandering can
have the effect of polarizing statehouses and Congress itself, leading to
increased gridlock and a dysfunctional political system. In many states
race, while not a perfect proxy for party affiliation, is highly correlated
with it.89 Any attempt to “pack” minority voters into certain districts
likely results in more “safe” electoral districts for each party, which
could lead to an entrenchment of partisan gridlock, as there is no
electoral incentive for representatives to moderate or cooperate with
the other side. Such institutionalized polarization undermines the
norms of cooperation and collaboration necessary for a functional
representative democracy. The Court should have been mindful of
these policy objectives when making its decision.
CONCLUSION
This case was yet another in a long line of redistricting cases. The
Court did well to clarify the test for racial predominance – but should
have held that the facts of this case satisfy the test. Accordingly, it
should have held that race predominated in all twelve districts. As to
the strict scrutiny analysis, it should also have demanded a higher
standard for a “strong basis in evidence” that the 55% BVAP was
needed. Additionally, in order to protect the rights of minority groups
and guard against political polarization and gridlock, the Court should
have placed a stronger limit on racial gerrymandering.

87. Id.
88. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
89. See Election 2016 Exit Polls, Virginia–President, CNN (Nov. 9, 2016) http://www.cnn.com
/election/results/exit-polls/virginia/president.

